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Abstract 
The article conceptualizes the quality of political information and shows how the concept 
can be used for empirical research. I distinguish three aspects of quality (intelligibility, relevance, 
validity) and use them to judge the constituent foundations of political information, that is 
component claims (statements of alleged facts) and connection claims (argumentative statements 
created by causally linking two component claims). The resulting conceptual map thus entails six 
manifestations of information quality (component claim intelligibility, connection claim 
intelligibility, component claim relevance, connection claim relevance, component claim validity, 
and connection claim validity). I explain how the conceptual map can be used to make sense of 
the eclectic variety of existing research, and how it can advance new empirical research, as a 
guide for determining variation in information quality, as a conceptual template for the analysis 
of different types of political messages and their common quality deficiencies, and as a generator 
of new research questions and theoretical expectations. 
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Introduction 
 
Information is the principal political currency. It shapes what and how we think of 
politics; political actors acquire, manipulate, and disseminate it to achieve their objectives; and 
the institutionally prescribed relations between people and policy-makers in both democratic and 
autocratic regimes cannot function without it. Even the less cerebral forms of political interaction, 
such as emotional appeals, hot cognitions, and group identities, need to be sustained by 
information. But when is information good enough to serve its purpose, and what happens when 
the quality of information is too low? What is the quality of political information, and how can 
different aspects of information quality be distinguished? 
The article offers answers to these questions in order to advance theory-guided empirical 
research about the causes and consequences of variation in the quality of political information. 
This is particularly important during a time in which disinformation, misinformation, and fake 
news have become serious concerns in both mass politics and international affairs, while 
traditional quality claims based on evidence, established procedures of news reporting, and 
scientific methodology are under attack from populist politicians and movements. However, 
despite the great significance of political information, and despite the fact that many fields of 
scholarship are concerned with it, political science and cognate disciplines have not yet engaged 
in systematic attempts to make sense of the quality of political information and its manifestations. 
Existing studies use a wide variety of partially overlapping and less than perfectly 
demarcated terms to identify different aspects and deficiencies of information quality, such as 
diagnostic value (Kuklinski et al 2001), political clarity (Dalton 1985), argument strength (Areni 
and Lutz 1988), argument quality (Clark and Wegener 2009), information accuracy (Shikano et 
al. 2017), misleading statements (Jerit and Barabas 2006), fake news (Lazer et al 2018), and 
imperfect information (Weyland 2014). The eclectic terminology used in prior research reflects 
the absence of a commonly accepted and well-defined concept of the meaning and manifestations 
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of the quality of political information. Empirical studies relying on the existing concepts 
frequently fail to pinpoint the particular manifestation of information quality that affects certain 
political outcomes. The purpose of this article is to remedy that problem, by developing a concept 
of the quality of political information, and by showing how the concept can be used not only to 
make sense of existing studies, but also to advance new empirical research.  
In the first part of the article, I develop a simple model of political information based on 
the principles of argumentation by Toulmin (2003). The model identifies component claims 
(statements of alleged facts) as the atoms of political information and connection claims 
(argumentative statements created by causally linking two component claims) as the molecules. 
In the second part of the article, I conceptualize quality as an intrinsic feature of the content of 
political information. In the beginning, I invoke Grice’s (1975) conversation rules to develop a 
concept of the meaning of quality that distinguishes three aspects of quality, namely 
intelligibility, relevance, and validity. After that, I establish a conceptual map of the quality of 
political information by applying the three quality judgments to the two previously introduced 
building blocks of information. The quality of political information thus entails six 
manifestations, that is component claim intelligibility, connection claim intelligibility, component 
claim relevance, connection claim relevance, component claim validity, and connection claim 
validity. I use the conceptual map to classify existing studies of information quality from a wide 
range of thematic fields, including political behavior, party politics, public administration, 
political communication, political development, and international relations. In the third part of the 
article, I show how my model can be applied to empirical research. I discuss, in turn, how the 
model can be used to determine variation in information quality, how it can serve as a conceptual 
foundation for studying the quality of different kinds of political messages, and how it can help 
generate new research questions and theoretical expectations. The fourth part of the article offers 
a brief conclusion and discussion. 
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A simple model of political information 
 
My concept of information quality rests on a simple model of political information, which 
I develop from the bottom up beginning with the constituent rhetorical foundations. I conceive of 
the foundational units of political information as component claims and connection claims. These 
two building blocks of political information are political statements, which are contained by 
larger units of information, that is political messages, which in turn might be nested in political 
information packages. For instance, political messages such as a newspaper article, a policy 
justification, or a campaign slogan represent a certain amount of text that might contain just one, 
several, or even many political statements. The election manifestos of christian democratic parties 
between 1980 and 2010, the New York Times published on the 1st of September 1977, and the 
collected speeches of the members of the European Parliament are political information 
packages, meaning larger composite containers of a certain number of political statements, 
distinguished by some shared characteristic, and frequently composed of separate political 
messages. Political information distributors are channels through which political information is 
disseminated, such as newspapers, twitter, or election manifestos. Judgments of information 
quality can be made for individual component and connection claims, and they can be 
summarized (or identified separately) at any level of aggregation, including certain combinations 
of claims, political messages, political information packages, or entire political information 
distributors. 
My model disassembles larger units of political information into the foundational items of 
which they are composed by transferring the micro-perspectives of linguistics and argumentation 
studies to the unique domain of politics. I rely specifically on the work of Stephen Toulmin 
(2003), who proposes a conception of the structure of arguments that I am taking as the starting 
point for my own model. His most basic and unconstrained form of argumentation, which he calls 
a “skeleton of a pattern for analyzing arguments” consists of “data”, “warrant”, and “conclusion” 
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(Toulmin 2003, 92). The relation between these three components is such that a piece of data, or 
in other words a fact, is initially stated and then used to draw a conclusion through a warrant. For 
instance, in Toulmin’s own example, the data “Harry was born in Bermuda” leads to the 
conclusion “Harry is a British subject” because of the mediating warrant that “a man born in 
Bermuda will be a British subject.” 
The distinction between “data” and “conclusion” is not inherent to the content of these 
statements. The difference in nomenclature stems exclusively from the function the statements 
perform in an argument. After all, both “data” and “conclusions” are by their very nature single 
units of information. The Toulminian “data” of one argument can easily become a “conclusion” 
in another argument, and vice versa. For instance, the statement “Harry is a British subject”, 
which performs the argumentative function of “conclusion” in the previous example, becomes 
“data” in another argument with the conclusion that “Harry has the right to vote in Britain.” This 
is why I propose that all political messages rest on one type of foundational unit, which consists 
of a single statement of an alleged fact. This foundational unit, which I call component claim, 
constitutes the atom of political information (see figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Political information  
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Why speak of “component claims” instead of “facts” or “data”? First, as explained above, 
the choice of terminology serves to highlight that these are as of yet functionally unspecified 
items of information, which can perform the functions of both “data” and “conclusion.” Second, I 
am using the term component claims to emphasize that these items are at the same time 
indivisible and constitutive of larger units of political information. Third, speaking of component 
claims rather than “facts” or “data” signals openness to different kinds of information, including 
not only facts in the narrow sense (“Britain has a plurality electoral system”), but also demands 
(“The West should ally with Saudi-Arabia to fight Iran”) and suppositions (“Britain will continue 
to have a two-party system”). Fourth, the choice of terminology underscores that component 
claims can be based on more than one data point, for example in statements that involve 
comparisons (“Iran is more dangerous than Saudi-Arabia”) or analogies (“the refusal of the 
United States to sign the Paris Climate Change Convention is equivalent to the decision of North 
Korea to not sign the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty”).  
Fifth, I am speaking of component claims, because these atoms of political information 
are subject to variation in judgments of truth. The truth value of a factual statement such as 
“Britain has a plurality electoral system” is typically less disputed than that of suppositions and 
demands. But even in the field of seemingly straightforward factual statements, perceived truth 
values can vary quite strongly between statements and recipients. The claim “Russia has more 
than 100 million inhabitants”, for example, will be much less controversial than the claim “Russia 
has violated international treaties 78 times in the past 3 years,” and one can also easily imagine 
that representatives of the Russian government will be less willing to accept the latter statement 
as true than the average Ukrainian foreign policy official. In the end, my specifications and 
modifications of the basic “skeleton” suggested by Toulmin reflect his own emphasis on the 
field-variant nature of argumentation. I develop a model of political information, and the field of 
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politics is more than other social systems subject to the widespread use of demands and 
suppositions as well as controversy over many of even the simplest statements of fact. 
Connection claims are the second foundational unit of political information (see figure 1). 
They consist of two (atomic) component claims that are bound together (into a molecule) by a 
term indicating causality (such as “because”, “which is why”, or “given that”). For instance, the 
component claims “Harry was born in Bermuda” and “Harry is a British citizen” can be turned 
into a connection claim by stating that “Harry is a British citizen because he was born in 
Bermuda.” In the unique domain of politics, connection claims include not only analytical 
statements (“Britain will continue to have a two-party system, because Britain has a plurality 
electoral system”), but also prescriptive statements (“Iran is more dangerous than Saudi-Arabia, 
which is why the West should ally with Saudi-Arabia to fight Iran”).1  
Connection claims represent a streamlined version of what Toulmin (2003) and 
argumentation research in general would refer to as an “argument.” So why call them 
“connection claims” instead of “arguments”? First, speaking of connections serves to emphasize 
that connection claims are the molecules of political information, created by establishing a link 
between two atomic component claims. Second, the term connection claim is purposefully open 
to cover both analytical and prescriptive types of statements. Third, the reference to connection 
claims underscores the contested nature of political statements. It underlines the unique character 
of political information compared to information in other domains. Fourth, speaking of 
connection claims highlights that this type of political statement can be used for different 
objectives other than “argumentation”, which is traditionally defined as “a verbal, social, and 
rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of the acceptability of a standpoint” (van 
Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, 1). Clearly, the process of intentional persuasion identified in 
 
1 What Hochschild and Einstein (2015) call “factual information” (585) is roughly equivalent to 
component claims, and what they call “slightly more complicated questions of fact, because they 
involve causal links” (586), is similar to connection claims.  
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this definition is one way in which connection claims are used in politics, but they can also be 
used for other objectives, including information provision, priming, agenda setting, framing, 
mobilization, conflict resolution, and demand making.2 
I distinguish component and connection claims from political evidence claims. 
Component and connection claims are the primary foundational units of political information in 
my model, whereas political evidence claims are auxiliary units that exist exclusively to lend 
support to component and connection claims. Political evidence claims encompass not only the 
“warrants” of Toulmin’s (2003, 92) “skeleton” of argumentation, but also what he calls 
“backing”, meaning “other assurances, without which the warrants themselves would possess 
neither authority nor currency” (Toulmin 2003, 96). In the previously introduced example, the 
statement “Harry was born in Bermuda” constitutes the “data” that facilitates the conclusion 
“Harry is a British subject”, through the mediating warrant that “a man born in Bermuda will be a 
British subject.” The warrant used in this argument, according to Toulmin (2003), can be further 
solidified through additional “backing", for example by stating the warrant’s legal basis.  
My model of political information merges “warrant” and “backing” into the category of 
political evidence claims and does not require connection claims to have a “warrant.” This is 
done to better reflect the specific character of political information. I would argue that connection 
claims in politics do not necessarily contain a supporting reason (that is a warrant). Arguments 
without giving a reason for the alleged existence of a connection between two component claims 
might have lower quality, but they are entirely conceivable and quite common. By not requiring a 
warrant in the Toulminian sense, the model of political information I develop allows for that 
possibility, which then makes it possible to estimate the effect that the existence respectively the 
absence of a warrant or other political evidence (that is “backing”) might have on the quality of 
political statements.  
 
2 For additional discussion see Vössing and Weber (2019, 533).  
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Political evidence claims come in many forms, including not only references to research 
findings, but also additional data points, legal provisions, and generalized rules that sustain 
claims about specific cases. They can support a single component claim, component claims that 
are part of a connection claim, as well as the connection claim itself. The classification of a unit 
of political information as a political evidence claim is justifiable as long as the unit exists 
exclusively in an auxiliary function to support some primary political statement, that is a 
connection claim or a component claim. Whenever a unit of information constitutes a political 
statement in its own right, it should also be treated as a separate component claim or connection 
claim. Judgments about whether some statement is auxiliary or primary in specific analyses 
depend on the statement’s relations to other statements and a range of additional factors including 
the motive of the speaker and the communication context. 
 
The quality of political information: conceptual map and classification of existing studies 
 
I am now proposing a conception of the meaning of quality, which delineates the aspects 
of quality that can be used to judge political information. To that end, I turn to the field of 
pragmatics, which studies the meaning of language and communication in its real-world context. 
From this point of departure, Grice (1975) has developed widely accepted normative standards 
for the quality of the content of communication. These standards can also be applied to judge the 
quality of political information, given that political information constitutes a type of 
communicated content. Grice (1975, 46) summarizes his standards for the content of 
communication in three “supermaxims”: “try to make your contribution one that is true”, “be 
relevant”, and “be perspicuous.” The quality of the content of communication in general and of 
political information in particular can thus be conceived of as having three dimensions, namely 
validity, relevance, and intelligibility. 
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My concept of the quality of political information relies on the three pertinent 
supermaxims formulated by Grice (1975). The normative standards delineated by these 
supermaxims describe what quality is all about, while my previously outlined model of political 
information designates the constituent components of political information to which the quality 
judgments can be applied. Applying the three normative standards for high-quality 
communication (intelligibility, relevance, and validity) to the two foundational units of political 
information (component claims and connection claims) yields a typology that designates six 
manifestations of the quality of political information. As shown in table 1, the typology outlines a 
comprehensive map of the various types of information quality in politics. According to this 
conceptual map, the quality of political information encompasses component claim intelligibility, 
connection claim intelligibility, component claim relevance, connection claim relevance, 
component claim validity, and connection claim validity. I am now discussing each of the aspects 
of quality in turn, and I show how the conceptual map can be used to classify a representative 
selection of existing empirical studies from different thematic fields.3  
 
 
Table 1: Conceptual map of the quality of political information 
 
 
Type of  
quality judgment 
Object of  
quality judgment 
Intelligibility Relevance Validity 
Component claim Component claim intelligibility 
Component claim 
relevance 
Component claim 
validity 
Connection claim Connection claim intelligibility 
Connection claim 
relevance 
Connection claim 
validity 
 
 
 
 
3 Note that each manifestation of information quality can be measured objectively (using expert 
ratings, for example) or subjectively (by asking recipients). I discuss this topic below in the 
section about the empirical application of my model.  
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Intelligibility  
Intelligibility identifies the extent to which the content and meaning of political 
statements are comprehensible. Grice (1975) substantiates his supermaxim advocating 
intelligibility (“be perspicuous”) through a list of more specific rules, namely “avoid obscurity of 
expression“, “avoid ambiguity”, “be orderly“, and “be brief” (46). One way of violating the first 
two precepts has been identified by Schellens and de Jong (2004). They suggest that leaving 
“implicit” (302) the connections between actions and their consequences reduces the 
intelligibility of these connection claims. I believe that a negative effect of such implicitness on 
intelligibility is entirely possible, but I would argue that failing to make connection claims 
explicit will only reduce their intelligibility when recipients require an explicit statement to 
understand the presence of the causal connection and the meaning of its constitutive component 
claims. In politics, suggestive argumentation constitutes a ubiquitous case of implicit yet 
intelligible connection claims. For instance, a right-wing politician saying “Maybe foreigners are 
not more prone to be criminals, but many of them live in the neighborhood where yesterday’s 
murder occurred” is suggesting implicitly that a foreigner is responsible for the murder. His 
coded language is still fully intelligible, and maybe even more appealing to his core audience. 
Suggestive argumentation can be crafted so proficiently that its meaning becomes 
completely concealed to outsiders. For instance, Albertson (2015) finds that the religious 
connotation of “multi-vocal” political messages is recognized only by believers. Politicians can 
use these messages to reach insiders without alienating others. Haney Lopez (2014) describes the 
same mechanism for coded racial appeals. These scenarios raise important questions about the 
identification of intelligibility and the underlying meaning of information. They highlight the 
distinction between the motive of the speaker (specifically his intention to produce a message that 
is understood in different ways by different groups) and the outcome of his communication (the 
actual meaning as well as the quality of the statement). Intelligibility, just like relevance and 
validity, is a feature of the content of information. It should be judged on its own terms, because 
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the political consequences of quality depend on its (objective or subjectively perceived) nature 
rather than the speaker’s motives. The distinction between objective and subjective measurement, 
explained in more detail below, is critical in this context. It allows us to determine whether 
differential meanings are effectively transported to different groups, how successfully this has 
been done (based on subjective judgments of intelligibility in these groups), and how the 
subjective judgments compare to objective standards of political discourse. 
That meaning can be communicated in a highly intelligible fashion without making an 
entire claim fully explicit is true not only for connection claims but also for component claims. 
For instance, a member of parliament might say in a speech that “introducing the Euro-tax is 
good for social justice.” The two component claims bound together in this connection claim are 
not made fully explicit, as the politician says neither that “the Euro-tax is a good policy” nor that 
“social justice is a desirable goal.” A fully explicit rendition of her statement would be “The 
Euro-tax is a good policy, and it advances the desirable goal of social justice.” Making her 
statement fully explicit would not increase intelligibility, since it is already sufficiently clear from 
context that she likes both the policy she defends and the goal allegedly advanced by the policy. 
Grice’s (1975) precepts “be brief” and “be orderly” are in conflict here with his precepts “avoid 
obscurity” and “avoid ambiguity”. But in this particular example, being brief and therefore more 
orderly is arguably better for intelligibility than the alternative of a lengthy statement that would 
fully expunge obscurity and ambiguity. 
The concept of “connections left implicit” studied by Schellens and de Jong (2004) is 
exclusively about connection claim intelligibility. It is contained by a single cell in the six-cell 
typology and thus clearly demarcated from other manifestations of the quality of political 
information. The same is true for Shikano et al. (2017), who conceive of “information accuracy” 
in bureaucratic decision-making as a form of component claim intelligibility that depends on the 
amount of noise included with pertinent information (230). Other studies use less clearly 
demarcated terms that cover a wider conceptual space extending into at least one additional 
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manifestation of information quality. To begin with, some studies investigate intelligibility 
without making a clear-cut distinction between connection and component claims. For instance, 
research on party politics has a long tradition of identifying the “clarity of party positions” 
(Dalton 1985) or more broadly the “ideological clarity” of a party (Lo et al 2014), both of which 
entails component and connection claims. Jerit (2009) studies the style of news coverage (“how 
an issue is covered“, 442), which also involves component and connection claim intelligibility. In 
the field of political behavior, “diagnostic value” (Kuklinski et al 2001) is one of the most 
frequently invoked concepts related to the quality of political information. It represents a 
composite syndrome of information quality that encompasses the intelligibility and relevance of 
connection and component claims. Research on political development uses terms such as 
“imperfect” (Weyland 2014), “inadequate” (Vössing 2017), and “poor” (Schedler 2013) 
information to identify the same syndrome. Elaborating on existing research, my conceptual map 
makes it possible to spell out the relative causal effects of specific manifestations of information 
quality that are currently merged into broad syndromic concepts. 
Intelligibility refers to the quality of the content of political information. It is distinct from 
the quality of people’s information endowment. The former is understudied, while the latter is one 
of the most frequently studied topics in the field of political behavior. For instance, delli Carpini 
and Keeter (1996) investigate the status and ramifications of variation in political knowledge, 
which is determined by the amount of information people accumulate. Converse (1964) observes 
a dearth of systematic belief systems in the American mass public, which also stems from limited 
exposure to political information. On this background, a wide range of existing studies 
investigate the modalities and consequences of people’s (limited) engagement with information, 
such as whether they use information effectively to cast correct votes (Lau and Redlawsk 1997), 
make good political judgments (Kuklinski et al 2001), avoid partisan bias (Bartels 2002), and 
hold accurate views of political conditions (Holbrook and Weinschenk 2020). It is important to 
distinguish the accumulation and use of information at the individual level from the quality of 
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information supply, which is the concern of this article, because it makes a difference, for 
instance, whether non-rational political choices are individual fallacies rooted in limited exposure 
to information or the result of poor information quality. 
 
Relevance 
The relevance of political information describes the extent to which the information 
occurs in a meaningful relation with the context in which it is communicated. Grice (1975) 
simply recommends “be relevant” without detailing more specific precepts. Both connection 
claims and component claims can be subjected to judgments of relevance. For instance, the 
component claim “Britain uses plurality voting in its electoral system” and the connection claim 
“People vote for the two major parties in plurality electoral systems because they do not wish to 
waste their votes” are arguably valid and intelligible. But it depends very much on the context in 
which they exist whether they are also relevant. It is fair to suggest that they are relevant when 
used in a debate about the failure of the Green party to secure seats in the UK parliament, but 
they are irrelevant to a wide range of unrelated topics and conversations. Just like the other 
aspects of information quality, relevance refers to the content of information rather than the 
motive of the speaker. Some politicians, for instance, might honestly try to offer relevant 
information, but when they fail in their efforts, we would have to conclude that their statements 
suffer from a lack of relevance. 
In existing research, relevance is rarely separated from other aspects of information 
quality. A notable exception is Austen-Smith (1992), who distinguishes the validity of connection 
claims about the consequences of certain actions (“validity of action-outcome claim”) from the 
relevance of such statements to the decision-maker (“relevance of action-outcome claim”). Most 
existing research treats relevance as an integral part of a larger syndrome of information quality. 
Several studies introduced above (Kuklinski et al 2001, Weyland 2014, Schedler 2013, Vössing 
2017) conceive of quality as a combination of relevance and intelligibility. Some studies of 
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political persuasion in the tradition of the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) employ the 
commonly used terms “argument quality” (Clark and Wegener 2009) and “argument strength” 
(Zhao et al 2011) to designate syndromes of information quality involving validity and relevance. 
Explicitly distinguishing relevance from validity and intelligibility allows us to determine the 
relative impact of these separate manifestations of information quality on political outcomes. 
 
Validity 
Validity identifies the truth value of political statements. It might be affected by variation 
in intent, but it constitutes a judgment about the outcome (specifically the content) rather than the 
motive of communication. That being said, existing studies of the validity of political information 
can be conveniently distinguished based on their varying assumptions about the intentions of the 
communicator. First, the most prominent strand of research investigates the malicious production 
and dissemination of objectively false information, using terms such as “fake news” (Lazer et al 
2018), “misinformation” (Nyhan and Reifler 2015), “disinformation” (Richey 2017, Ferrara 
2017), “misleading statements” (Nyhan and Reifler 2010, Jerit and Barabas 2006), and 
“objectively false rumors” (Berinsky 2017). Succinctly summarizing the dominant understanding 
of “fake news” and related terms, Lazer et al (2018, 1094) define it as “fabricated information 
that mimics news media content in form but not in organizational process or intent.” The 
definition illustrates that the focus of this scholarship lies on the intention and process of 
producing and distributing “fabricated information”. The features of the outcome of fake news 
production, that is fake news itself, are not directly identified. They are inferred from the 
attributes of the producers: “(f)ake-news outlets (…) lack the news media’s editorial norms and 
processes for ensuring the accuracy and credibility of information.”  
I believe that it is helpful to keep the quality of information (the outcome) conceptually 
distinct from the process of information production, and to define both phenomena on their own 
terms. This reflects the argument that Jamieson (2018) made about the distinction between fake 
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news and fake news dissemination. She also suggests a fitting term, “viral deception”, to 
designate the process of spreading fake news. Disentangling process and outcome based on my 
model of information quality increases not only conceptual clarity. It also offers analytical 
leverage. For example, existing research suggests that “misleading statements” (outcome) are 
produced by “misinformation” (process), but they could also stem from “disinformation” 
(process), “spreading of rumors” (process), “viral deception” (process), or a range of other 
processes unrelated to malicious motives and intentional fabrication, such as limited political 
sophistication or carelessness, which are currently not being investigated.  
Second, the concept of “falsified preferences” pioneered by Kuran (1997) puts an entirely 
different twist on the motives behind the production of invalid information, which highlights once 
again the importance of keeping outcome and process conceptually separate. The literature on 
fake news and similar phenomena suggests that the production and dissemination of invalid 
information results from nefarious intentions of powerful people and organizations. Kuran 
(1997), by contrast, demonstrates that producing and disseminating political lies can also be a 
necessary protective shield wielded by the weak. He suggests that oppositional politicians in 
repressive regimes falsify their preferences to avoid persecution, which shows that low-quality 
political information can come from the best of intentions. Falsifying preferences constitutes a 
case of invalid component claims, but it is prompted by survival instinct and a position of 
weakness rather than power and malicious intent. 
Third, in contrast to the other two strands of research, studies about the impact of 
information quality on political attitudes remain silent on the intentions of message 
communicators. In the framework of the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) of persuasion, 
these studies propose that “argument quality” (Areni and Lutz 1988, Petty and Wegener 1991) 
entails the validity of a connection claim about the consequences of an action (“Allowing shale 
gas fracking will make us all richer”) and the validity of a component claim about the desirability 
of that consequence (“being rich is a good thing”). The distinction was pioneered by Areni and 
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Lutz (1988). They use the term “argument strength” to designate the validity of the connection 
claim and “argument valence” for the validity of the component claim. Petty and Wegener (1991) 
use the terms “likelihood of consequence” for the former and “desirability of consequence” for 
the latter. In existing empirical research, Hoeken et al (2014) investigate both aspects of 
“argument quality” using the terms coined by Petty and Wegener (1991), while other studies 
focus on the quality of the connection claim using terms such as “validity of action-outcome 
claim” (Austen-Smith 1992) and “probability of consequence following from action” (Schellens 
and de Jong 2004). 
The validity of information is distinct from the persuasive effectiveness of information. As 
a matter of fact, in contrast to the literature on political persuasion discussed so far, the majority 
of contributions in the tradition of the ELM investigating “argument quality” or the 
interchangeably used “argument strength” (Petty and Cacioppo 1981, 1986, Eagly and Chaiken 
1993, Rydell and McConnell 2005) as well as studies of “frame strength” (Chong and Druckman 
2007, Druckman et al 2013, Aaroe 2011) are not about the quality of information but rather the 
capacity of information to change opinions, or in other words the information’s persuasive 
effectiveness. However, information quality and its various aspects are inherent features of a 
political statement, whereas the capacity of a political statement to change opinions is a 
consequence of the statement and a range of other factors associated with it, such as the speaker 
and the channel.  
The focus of research about argument strength on the persuasive effectiveness of 
information reflects the original formulations of the ELM (Petty and Cacioppo 1981, 1986), 
which distinguishes weak from strong arguments based on how compelling and impactful people 
find them. Research on frame strength applies the same logic to the quality of frames, defining “a 
frame’s strength as increasing with its perceived persuasiveness” (Chong and Druckman 2007, 
638), so that “(w)eak frames are typically seen as unpersuasive, whereas strong frames are 
compelling.” In order to advance research on political persuasion, Chong and Druckman (2007) 
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and Aaroe (2011) highlight the critical distinction between the nature (including the quality) of 
political information and its capacity to change opinions, and they call for more research about 
the impact of quality on persuasiveness. By clarifying this distinction, and by identifying 
relevance, intelligibility, and validity as separate features of information quality, my model helps 
to delineate more clearly what information quality is about, and it provides the conceptual 
foundation for studying the impact of quality on persuasive effectiveness. The proposed model 
also facilitates analyses about the effects of information quality on other processes besides 
persuasion. For instance, the model makes it possible to study whether information quality 
changes the “affective tipping point” at which voters stop ignoring negative information about a 
preferred candidate (Redlawsk et al 2010), whether affective reactions to information depend on 
variation in quality (Erisen et al 2014), and how information quality influences the likelihood of 
making informed vote choices (Lau and Redlawsk 1997).  
 
Advancing new empirical research 
 
My model of the quality of political information can be used in empirical research to 
determine variation in information quality, to identify different political messages and their 
common quality deficiencies, and to generate new research questions and theoretical 
expectations. I am now discussing each of these three applications in turn. First, the model can be 
used to determine the quality of political information at all levels of aggregation, including the 
foundational political statements as well as political messages, information packages, and 
information distributors. The six manifestations of information quality established by the model 
can be assessed using different approaches to measurement, which vary in their nature (subjective 
or objective) and unit of analysis (message or recipient). Besides epistemology and 
operationalization, using one or the other approach also has important substantive implications. 
For instance, if objective validity deviates from subjective validity in the eyes of some 
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politician’s key constituency, it makes a huge difference for the nature of political 
communication, democratic standards, and public policy whether the politician aspires to tell the 
objective truth or the subjectively perceived truth of his median voter. 
The objective-recipient approach involves objective measurement of how individuals who 
receive information judge its quality. This is clearly the most demanding measurement strategy. It 
could be implemented, for instance, by recording physiological responses to information. The 
subjective-recipient approach relies on the subjective judgments made by information recipients. 
It can be implemented through thought listing (Cacioppo et al 1981) as well as direct questions 
about the content of information (Zhao et al 2011). Following a subjective-message approach 
means to aggregate individual responses to the message level, for example by calculating an 
average value of intelligibility of a political message from a survey of individual judgments. 
In research on political persuasion, the dominant subjective-recipient and subjective-
message approaches (Cacioppo et al 1981, Chong and Druckman 2007) have been countered by 
calls for an objective-message approach (Petty and Wegener 1998, O’Keefe and Jackson 1995). 
The objective-message approach applies normative standards, transparent procedures, and 
expertise to judge quality. Fact-checking websites, for example, rely on standardized coding rules 
as well as expert coders to determine the validity of politicians’ component claims. Studies of 
“readability” (Schumacher and Eskenazi 2016) and “language complexity” (Schoonvelde et al 
2019) employ linguistic tools to assess important facets of intelligibility. In addition, a wide range 
of other techniques from the bourgeoning field of text analysis can be applied to study the quality 
of political information using the objective-message approach. This includes hand-coding (Kriesi 
et al 2019) and automated procedures such as LIWC (Windsor et al 2019). 
Second, my model can be used to identify different types of political messages and their 
common deficiencies in information quality. The model is intentionally unconstrained, so that it 
can be applied as a conceptual template for the analysis of all categories of political messages. 
Public service announcements, campaign slogans, ministerial memos, and diplomatic declarations 
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all consist of component and connection claims. But they differ in terms of the typical number 
and interrelations of claims, so that they feature specific ways of exhibiting variation in 
intelligibility, relevance, and validity. My model can be used to identify the structure and 
composition of different political messages as well as their typical expressions of variation in 
quality. 
 
Figure 2: Policy justifications  
 
 
 
The political message that I discuss now to illustrate the usefulness of my model as a 
conceptual template, the policy justification, consists of a connection claim (“this desirable policy 
advances that worthy norm”) and its two constitutive component claims (“this is a desirable 
policy”, “that is a worthy norm”). The causal connection between the two component claims 
indicates that the desirable policy advances the worthy norm, which then justifies support for the 
policy (see figure 2). The statements “I support shale gas fracking, because it will increase our 
prosperity” and “I support shale gas fracking, because my party, to which I am loyal, supports it” 
represent typical examples of policy justifications.   
My model of the quality of political information serves as a conceptual template that 
allows me to identify common deficiencies in the quality of policy justifications. Table 2 shows 
specifically how judgments of low quality suggested by the model (not intelligible, not valid, not 
relevant) can be applied to the three political statements of which policy justifications are 
composed. This yields nine quality deficiencies of policy justifications, whose causes and 
consequences can be empirically investigated. Such research could focus on the ability of citizens 
to detect low-quality policy justifications, the impact of variation in quality on public opinion, or 
the conditions under which politicians use low-quality statements. 
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 To begin with, issue stretching constitutes an invalid claim about the connection between 
a policy and a norm that does not amount to an outright lie. It stretches the bounds of validity 
without breaking them. For instance, the statement “encouraging children to smoke is good for 
public health” constitutes a severe form of invalidity, while the statement “European integration 
has been good for social justice” is probably issue-stretched, but not a lie. By contrast, issue 
squeezing entails a causal connection that is valid yet irrelevant because it is too obvious. For 
instance, politicians justifying their support for policies extending the authority of the EU 
frequently argue that such policies are “good for European integration.” The two component 
claims contain virtually the same statement. They are squeezed together so tightly that the 
connection claim they establish becomes irrelevant.  
 
Table 2: Quality deficiencies in policy justifications 
 
 Not  
Intelligible 
Not  
Valid 
Not  
relevant 
Desirable policy  
(component claim) Purpose obfuscation  Fit overestimation Need misreading 
Worthy norm  
(component claim) Justification blurring  Value misjudgment Priority miscalculation 
Plausible policy-norm effect  
(connection claim) Issue clouding Issue stretching Issue squeezing 
 
Low relevance can also affect individual component claims. To begin with, need 
misreading identifies a justification in which an explainer advocates a policy that is irrelevant (to 
the subjective views of an audience or the objective requirements of a problem). For instance, 
endorsing a policy of reforming decision-making in the European Council as a specific solution 
to job losses resulting from digitalization arguably constitutes a case of (objective) need 
misreading. In the case of priority miscalculation, irrelevance refers to the norm that is invoked 
to justify a policy. For instance, justifying a policy of European integration by pointing out that it 
helps French farmers might be considered a case of (subjective) priority miscalculation when the 
justification is used in an assembly of workers from a decaying industrial town in Italy. 
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Fit overestimation occurs when a justification contains an invalid claim about the 
desirability of the justified policy. The policy can be undesirable for lacking objective fit (when it 
fails to solve problems) or subjective fit (when an audience dislikes it). For instance, advocating 
the abolition of formal employee consultation in a meeting of trade union leaders constitutes a 
case of (subjective) fit overestimation, because the audience arguably holds pre-existing negative 
opinions about the policy. By contrast, value misjudgment describes a policy justification that 
invokes an unworthy norm to defend a policy. For instance, a justification for European 
integration which claims that integration will foster christian values suffers from (subjective) 
value misjudgment when it is targeted at a group of atheists. 
Issue clouding constitutes a form of “connections left implicit” (Schellens and de Jong 
2004) in which an explicit mentioning of the causal link between two component claims would 
be required to make the justification intelligible. Purpose obfuscation means to make a claim 
about the desirability of a policy that is not intelligible, and justification blurring does the same 
for the invoked norm. All three deficiencies of intelligibility can be the result of statements that 
are genuinely unclear. For instance, a politician who uses pretentious vocabulary to state a norm 
that is allegedly achieved by a policy will not be understood by his voters (which constitutes a 
case of justification blurring). In addition, each of the three intelligibility deficiencies can also 
occur when otherwise clear claims about policies, norms, or policy-norm connections are 
overwhelmed by too much extraneous information.  
Third, my model of the quality of political information can also generate new research 
questions and theoretical expectations about the causes and consequences of information quality. 
To begin with, the model can prompt research about the trade-offs that arise when political actors 
attempt to maximize more than one aspect of information quality at the same time. For instance, 
greater validity of information communicated by political parties should be negatively related to 
intelligibility, especially for complex issues, and I would expect that parties will maximize 
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intelligibility above all else to effectively communicate with citizens (while remaining merely in 
the realm of plausible deniability with respect to the validity of their statements). 
Moreover, my distinction between (primary) political statements and (auxiliary) political 
evidence claims makes it possible to study systematically the way in which evidence affects the 
quality of political information. We should expect that both the presence and a higher quality of 
evidence increase subjective and objective validity judgments. But it is instructive to evaluate the 
boundaries of this effect. Does the accumulation of evidence negatively affect intelligibility and 
relevance, and are there conditions under which more evidence becomes detrimental even for 
judgments of validity?  
Finally, the model can also facilitate systematic reflection and analysis about the causes of 
information quality. For instance, why do political actors sometimes make valid, intelligible, and 
relevant statements and sometimes not? How much of their low-quality political statements can 
be attributed to cognitive factors, how much to motivation, and how much to variation in motive? 
In other words, do politicians lack the cognitive and political resources, maybe increasingly 
overwhelmed by the demands of their vocation, do they get sloppy and careless over time, or are 
they driven by varying rationales, such as habit, conviction, or strategic intent, that have 
differential effects on information quality? 
 
Conclusion and discussion 
 
The article outlined a model of the structure and quality of political information. It 
showed how different aspects of quality can be applied to judge the building blocks of political 
information, as well as the political messages that are constructed by using these blocks. The 
article also outlined a range of empirical applications of the model, including the classification of 
existing studies, the assessment of variation in information quality, the identification of different 
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classes of political messages and their typical quality deficiencies, as well as the production of 
new research questions and theoretical expectations. 
In addition, empirical applications of the model in different policy fields can also be 
useful for practitioners of political discourse. Findings about the quality of political statements 
would allow them to reflect on their rhetoric and facilitate more effective communication with 
their partners. The model can also contribute to the debate about the future of democracy. 
Reasoned communication based on high-quality political information constitutes a critical 
foundation of democratic discourse and accountability. The model helps to strengthen this 
deliberative core of democracy by offering concepts and tools that allow us to identify variation 
in quality and detect the propagators of good and bad political information.  
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